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ABSTRACT. During the last forty years, general equilibrium theorists have been especially concerned 
with the analysis of economies in which forward markets for commodities are limited in number or non-
existent and trade takes place sequentially over time. Many distinguished scholars approached the study 
of such economies in the 1970s from the perspective of temporary equilibrium theory, which focuses on 
the behaviour of agents in a given period, stresses the dependence of agents’ choices on their subjective 
expectations of future prices and discusses the existence of general equilibrium on current markets. 
Research in the field of temporary equilibrium theory was abandoned in the subsequent decade, 
however, and the work carried out in this area has since fallen into oblivion. The purpose of this paper 
is to provide an accessible exposition of temporary equilibrium theory and highlight the shortcomings 
that led to its abandonment in the conviction that basic knowledge of this area of research can prove 
conducive to correct appraisal of the current situation in general equilibrium analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
By the end of the 1960s, the intertemporal model of Arrow and Debreu (cf. Debreu, 
1959) was firmly established as the fundamental model of reference for general 
equilibrium analysis. The efforts of general equilibrium theorists were then directed 
towards overcoming the model’s evident limitation, namely the assumption that the 
transactions associated with the future activities of economic agents are all regulated at 
the initial date on the basis of a complete system of forward markets for commodities. 
Many of these efforts drew inspiration during the 1970s from an analytical approach 
outlined in Hicks (1939) and gave rise to modern temporary equilibrium theory, the 
basic features of which can be summarised as follows. As in the Arrow-Debreu model, 
time is divided into a sequence of periods. It is, however, assumed with a view to the 
realistic representation of trading processes that spot markets for commodities are 
active in every period. It is further assumed that spot markets coexist with some asset 
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markets, such as a restricted set of forward commodity markets. Within this 
framework, the theory focuses on the behaviour of agents in the initial period, stresses 
the dependence of agents’ choices on their individual expectations as regards future 
prices, and discusses the existence of general equilibrium on current markets. A 
distinctive feature of the analysis is that no substantial restriction is placed a priori on 
the expectations held by agents at the beginning of the first period. Temporary 
equilibrium theory is thus ready to acknowledge that economic agents have limited 
predictive capabilities and may for this reason base their choices on erroneous 
expectations. 
 Research in the field of temporary equilibrium theory attracted many 
distinguished scholars during the 1970s but was gradually abandoned in the subsequent 
decade. The work carried out in the field has since fallen into a sort of oblivion, as 
attested by the fact that temporary equilibrium models are not even mentioned in recent 
textbooks. It is, however, our belief that basic knowledge of this area of research can 
still be of use today with respect to correct appraisal of the current situation in general 
equilibrium analysis. In accordance with this conviction, we shall endeavour to provide 
an accessible exposition of temporary equilibrium theory and highlight the analytical 
problems leading to its abandonment.  
 The paper is organised as follows. Temporary equilibrium theory is first 
illustrated in Section 2 with reference to a simple pure-exchange economy. The 
extension of the theory to the case of economies with production is then discussed in 
Section 3. Section 4 goes on to examine the application of the theory to the study of 
monetary economies. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions concerning the reasons that 
led to the abandonment of temporary equilibrium theory and briefly comments on a 
related aspect of current general equilibrium analysis. 
 
 2.  An introductory pure-exchange model  
We shall begin our exposition of temporary equilibrium theory by focusing attention on 
the simplest analytical case. Consider a pure-exchange economy with H households 
(indexed by h = 1, …, H) and N ≥ 2 non-storable consumption goods (indexed by            
n = 1, …, N) that is active for two periods of time, period 1 (the present) and period 2 
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(the future). At the beginning of period 1, by assumption, there are N distinct spot 
markets for the different consumption goods and a forward market for good 1, i.e. a 
market on which contracts can be traded for the delivery of physical units of good 1 at 
the beginning of the next period. In period 2, only the N spot markets for commodities 
are open. Given this market structure, we shall now introduce a further assumption 
informally and provide an initial, intuitive account of the behaviour of agents in the 
first period. 
 Assume that each household observes the prices quoted on the N+1 current 
markets at the beginning of period 1 and forms definite expectations as regards the 
future relative prices of commodities in terms of good 1. Under those circumstances the 
generic household h will calculate that by trading appropriately on the single forward 
market in existence, it can purchase or sell commodities for future delivery as freely as 
in the presence of a complete system of forward markets. To clarify this point, let us 
consider any of the N–1 commodities other than good 1, say ‘grapes’, and assume that 
household h thinks a unit of grapes will exchange in period 2 for three units of good 1. 
The household will then calculate that if it wishes to purchase in the present one unit of 
grapes for future delivery, it can obtain this result by buying forward three units of 
good 1 in the anticipation of exchanging them for the desired unit of grapes in period 2. 
Similarly, the household will calculate that if it wishes to sell in the present a unit of 
grapes to be delivered in the future, it can obtain this result by selling forward three 
units of good 1 in the anticipation of surrendering a unit of grapes in period 2 against 
three units of good 1 and then using those units to honour its forward sale. 
 The above example shows that for a household endowed with definite 
expectations as regards future relative prices, trading on the single forward market open 
in period 1 is essentially a way of transferring purchasing power across time. By 
buying forward units of good 1 at the current price, the household can thus transfer to 
period 2 the purchasing power (in terms of good 1) that it considers necessary in order 
to finance its desired future consumption. In the same way, by selling forward units of 
good 1 at the current price, the household can capitalise in the present the expected 
purchasing power (in terms of good 1) of any commodity or commodity bundle that it 
wishes to surrender in period 2. In order to highlight this aspect of the economy under 
consideration, we shall refer to the single forward market in existence as a market for 
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bonds specified in terms of good 1, where the unit bond is defined as a promise to 
deliver a physical unit of good 1 at the beginning of period 2. 
 Given that the bond market allows for intertemporal transfers of purchasing 
power, it is reasonable to assume that households will simultaneously plan both their 
present and their future consumption at the beginning of period 1. We shall accordingly 
assume that each household trades commodities for present consumption and bonds at 
the initial date so as to attain the most preferred consumption stream over periods 1 and 
2. By definition, a state of the economy in which all households trade in this way, and 
individual trades are such that all the N+1 current markets clear, is a temporary 
equilibrium of the exchange economy for period 1. In the remainder of this section the 
behaviour of households will be examined in detail with the aid of some formalisation. 
In order to simplify the exposition, it will be assumed that good 1 is the numéraire in 
terms of which both the current and the expected prices are measured. 
 
2.1   The formal model 
We shall first address the characteristics of the H households operating in the economy 
at the beginning of period 1. Let a two-period consumption stream of the generic 
household h be denoted by the vector hx12  = (
hx1 , 
hx2 ), where the sub-vector 
h
tx = (
h
tx1 , 
… , hNtx ) denotes a consumption bundle for period t (t = 1, 2). We assume that the set 
of admissible consumption streams, or two-period consumption set, of the generic 
household is X h12  = 
N2
+ℜ . We further assume that the generic household knows its 
current commodity endowments h1ω = ( h11ω , …, hN1ω ) at the initial date and takes it for 
granted that its future endowments will be h2ω  = ( h12ω , …, hN 2ω ). Finally, in order to 
simplify the analysis, we introduce the following assumption concerning the 
households’ preferences and endowments: 
 
Assumption 2.1. (a) The generic household h has a preference ordering over two-
period consumption streams in X h12  that can be represented by the continuous, 
strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave utility function hU ( hx1 , 
hx2 ); 
(b)  for all  h, h1ω  >> 0, h2ω >> 0. 
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 As regards the prices guiding households’ choices, we shall denote the prices in 
terms of good 1 ruling on current markets by the non-negative vector  p = ( 1p , 1q ), 
where the sub-vector 1p  = ( 11p , … , 1Np ) with 11p  = 1 refers to the N spot markets for 
commodities and the scalar 1q  is the price of a unit bond. As regards the future spot 
prices expected by households at the initial date, we assume that individual price 
forecasts are both subjective, and therefore likely to differ among agents, and certain, 
in the sense that each household expects a definite price system to obtain in the future 
with probability 1. The system of future prices in terms of good 1 as expected by the 
generic household h will be accordingly denoted by the vector hp2  = (
hp12 , … , 
h
Np 2 ) 
with   hp12 = 1. In general, expected prices will depend both on the prices observed in 
the past and on those currently observed. For the moment, however, we shall assume 
that price forecasts are based exclusively on past prices and therefore independent of 
current prices (fixed expectations). We shall further assume that expected prices are 
strictly positive.  
  
Assumption 2.2. (a) The system of future prices hp2  expected by the generic household h 
is given at the initial date independently of current prices; 
(b) for all h, hp2  >> 0. 
 
 We shall now go on to examine the behaviour of households at the opening of 
markets in period 1. To begin with, we assume that each household issues a quantity of 
bonds corresponding to the maximum it expects to be able to repay in the future. Given 
that the unit bond entitles the holder to the future delivery of one unit of numéraire, this 
means that the quantity of bonds issued by the generic household h coincides 
numerically with the value of the household’s future endowments as anticipated by the 
household itself.  
 
Assumption 2.3. At the beginning of period 1 the generic household h issues a quantity 
of bonds hb1  such that  
hb1 = 
hp2
h
2ω . 
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 By issuing bonds in accordance with Ass. 2.3, the generic household h capitalises 
at the initial date the expected value of its future endowments. Since the receipts from 
this operation amount to ( 1q
hb1 ) units of numéraire, the total wealth that the household 
can spend in period 1 on goods for present consumption and bonds is                             
hW1 = 1p
h
1ω + 1q hb1 . The first period budget constraint of household h can therefore be 
written as 
 
1p
hx1 + 1q
hb1  = 1p
h
1ω  + 1q hb1                                                                               (2.1) 
 
where hb1  denotes the quantity of bonds demanded. On the other hand, the household 
anticipates that it will have to surrender its entire endowment h2ω  in period 2 in order to 
honour the bonds issued in period 1, and therefore calculates that the wealth it will be 
able to spend in the future on its own consumption is wholly determined by the 
repayment of the bonds purchased in the present. The (expected) second period budget 
constraint of household h thus reads as follows: 
 
hp2
hx2  = 
hb1                                                                                                             (2.2) 
 
 The description of agents’ behaviour at the beginning of period 1 can be finally 
completed by assuming that each household chooses its current consumption of goods, 
current demand for bonds and planned future consumption so as to attain a most 
preferred two-period consumption stream subject to budget constraints (2.1)-(2.2). It 
can be stated in formal terms that the choice of the generic household h at given current 
prices p and fixed expected prices hp2  is a solution to the following maximisation 
problem: 
 
[2.I]   Maximise hU ( hx1 , 
hx2 )  with respect to 
hx1  ≥ 0, hb1  ≥ 0, hx2  ≥ 0 
 subject to constraints (2.1)-(2.2) 
  
Let a solution to problem [2.I] be denoted by the triple ( *1
hx , *1
hb , *2
hx ). It is clear that 
only the first two components will manifest themselves on current markets, in the form 
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of demand for commodities to be consumed in the present and demand for bonds, while 
planned future consumption *2
hx  will remain, as it were, in the household’s mind. It can 
therefore be stated that a solution to problem [2.I] identifies the optimal action           
*ha  = ( *1
hx , *1
hb ) taken by the generic household on period 1 markets.  
 The focusing of attention on budget constraints (2.1)-(2.2) will show how 
problem [2.I] can be solved. Note that by substituting for hb1  and 
hb1  in (2.1) according 
to (2.2) and Ass. 2.3 respectively, we obtain the equation 
 
1p
hx1 + 1q
hp2
hx2  = 1p
h
1ω  + 1q hp2 h2ω  
  
By adopting the convention hq = 1q
hp2 , this can be written as 
 
1p
hx1 + 
hq hx2  = 1p
h
1ω  + hq h2ω                                                                             (2.3) 
 
It thus emerges from the above manipulations that a solution to problem [2.I] is such 
that the corresponding consumption stream ( *1
hx , *2
hx ) fulfils equation (2.3), where the 
choice variable hb1  does not appear. On the other hand, we know that the chosen 
demand for bonds *1
hb  must fulfil constraint (2.2). It follows that problem [2.I] can be 
solved in two successive steps. In the first, household h determines its optimal 
consumption stream *12
hx  = ( *1
hx , *2
hx ) by solving the problem 
 
[2.II]   Maximise hU ( hx1 , 
hx2 )  with respect to 
hx1  ≥ 0, hx2  ≥ 0 
  subject to constraint (2.3) 
 
In the second, the household then determines through equation (2.2) the quantity of 
bonds to be purchased in order to finance planned future consumption, i.e. the quantity 
*
1
hb  such that *1
hb = hp2
*
2
hx . 
 Closer examination of the first step shows that constraint (2.3) in problem [2.II] 
can be interpreted as the single budget constraint that household h faces when choosing 
its consumption stream at the initial date. To clarify this point, recall that in the 
presence of a bond market, the generic household h feels that it can trade goods for 
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future delivery as freely as it could on a complete system of forward markets. Then 
note that from the viewpoint of household h, the N components of the vector 
hq appearing in (2.3) are precisely the prices at which this intertemporal trade of 
commodities can be carried out in the present. In other words, they are precisely the 
‘present prices’ for commodities to be delivered in the future. Examination of the first 
two components of hq will suffice to show that this is so. In view of the convention 
adopted, the first component is             hq1 = 1q
hp12  = 1q , i.e. precisely the ‘present 
price’ of a unit of good 1 for future delivery as actually quoted on the current bond 
market. On the other hand, the second component is hq2  = 1q
hp22 , where 
hp22  is the 
future spot price of commodity 2 as expected by household h. Given the argument put 
forward at the beginning of this section, it becomes clear that hq2  is indeed the ‘present 
price’ of a unit of good 2 for future delivery as calculated by household h, since it is 
both the price that the household would have to pay in the present in order to buy 
forward hp22  units of numéraire to be exchanged in the future for a unit of good 2, and 
the price that the household calculates it could obtain in the present for a unit of good 2 
to be delivered in the future. 
 On the above interpretation of hq  as a vector of ‘present prices’ for commodities 
to be delivered in period 2, it should be clear that the constraint (2.3) in problem [2.II] 
is the intertemporal budget constraint perceived by household h at the initial date. On 
the right-hand side we find the total wealth of the household, given by the value of 
current endowments plus the (expected) value of future endowments capitalised in the 
present, and on the left-hand side we find the household’s current expenditure for both 
present consumption and planned future consumption. We therefore conclude that in 
the first step of the procedure, the choice of the optimal consumption stream at current 
prices              p = ( 1p , 1q ) and fixed expected prices
hp2  is formally equivalent to 
standard consumer choice under complete forward markets at prices  p’ = ( 1p , 
hq ), 
where hq = 1q
hp2 . 
In the light of the abovementioned formal equivalence, the solution to problem 
[2.I] as emerging from the two-step procedure is easily discussed. Let us begin by 
examining the first step. Under Ass. 2.1 on households’ characteristics and Ass. 2.2 of 
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strictly positive expected prices, it is readily ascertained by analogy with basic 
consumer theory: (a) that the first step of the procedure univocally determines the 
consumption stream *12
hx  = ( *1
hx , *2
hx ) chosen by the generic household h at any given 
p∈ 1+++ℜN ; and (b) that each component of *12hx  changes continuously with p as the latter 
varies in 1+++ℜN . This means that both the current and the planned future demand for 
consumption goods on the part of the generic household can be represented as 
continuous functions of period 1 prices, provided that the latter remain strictly positive. 
These demand functions will be denoted respectively by hx1 (p) and 
hx2 (p) from now on. 
It should now be recalled that the quantity of bonds demanded by household h is 
determined in the second step of the procedure by the condition *1
hb = hp2
*
2
hx . This 
means that the household’s demand for bonds is also a continuous function of (strictly 
positive) current prices, that we shall denote by hb1 (p). In the light of the above 
considerations, it can finally be concluded that the continuous function ha (p) = ( hx1 (p), 
hb1 (p)) identifies the optimal action taken by the generic household at any given  
p∈ 1+++ℜN . 
 The ground has now been prepared for the formal definition of temporary 
equilibrium for the economy under examination. Let us restrict our analysis to strictly 
positive vectors of current prices and introduce the functions hz1 (p) = 
hx1 (p)–
h
1ω  and 
h
bz (p) = 
hb1 (p)–
hb1  (where 
hb1  is a given parameter in view of assumptions 2.3 and 
2.2(a)). It should be clear that hz1 (p) represents the period 1 excess demand function for 
commodities of the generic household h and hbz (p) the household’s excess demand 
function for bonds. Summation over the H households then yields the corresponding 
aggregate excess demand functions 1z (p) and bz (p), which are obviously continuous.1 
In this notation, a temporary equilibrium of the exchange economy for period 1 is 
finally defined as a system of current prices *p ∈ 1+++ℜN  and a corresponding set of 
                                                 
1 It is easily proved that these aggregate excess demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in  p 
and fulfil  Walras’s Law. 
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optimal actions { 1a ( *p ), … , Ha ( *p )} on the part of households such that the N+1 
market clearing conditions 1z (
*p ) = 0, bz (
*p ) = 0  are simultaneously fulfilled. 
 It can be proved that temporary equilibrium of the exchange economy exists 
under assumptions 2.1-2.3. Moreover, the existence of temporary equilibrium is 
preserved if it is assumed that individual expectations depend continuously on the 
current prices, i.e. if a continuous expectation function hΨ  such that hp2  = hΨ (p) is 
introduced for each h. We shall refrain from substantiating these assertions, as the 
introductory model examined here is a particular specification of the temporary 
equilibrium model put forward by Arrow and Hahn (1971: Ch. 6), to which readers are 
referred for existence proofs. (See footnote 4 for the relationship between the 
introductory model and the Arrow-Hahn model.) We shall instead focus in the 
remainder of this section on the analytical scope of the introductory model, which has 
taken us quite comfortably from the Arrow-Debreu world with complete forward 
markets to the more realistic environment of temporary equilibrium theory. It will be 
argued that the model contains a hidden problem and is not really robust. 
 
2.2   Discussion of the introductory  model 
The introductory model assumes that a single forward market is open in period 1 
together with the spot markets for the N consumption goods. This is a restrictive 
assumption, however, as temporary equilibrium theory only postulates that the number 
of forward markets in existence is lower than N. It is therefore natural to wonder 
whether the model is susceptible of generalisation to economies with a larger set of 
forward markets. As we shall now see, unfortunately, even a slight increase in the 
number of forward markets in existence has serious consequences for temporary 
equilibrium analysis. 
 Let us modify the introductory model by assuming that N > 2 consumption goods 
are traded in the economy and, more importantly, that two distinct forward markets are 
open at the initial date, say the forward market for good 1 and the forward market for 
good 2. (We could equivalently state that two distinct bond markets are open, one for 
bonds specified in terms of good 1 and the other for bonds specified in terms of good 
2.) This change in market structure necessitates some adjustment of the formal 
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description of the economy. To begin with, the current prices in terms of good 1 will 
now be denoted by the non-negative vector p = ( 1p , q), where sub-vector 1p  refers to 
spot markets and   sub-vector q = ( 1q , 2q ) to forward markets. It will also be 
convenient to denote the quantities of goods that the generic household h trades on 
forward markets by the vector hb = ( hb1 , 
hb2 ), where by assumption 
h
ib  > 0 indicates a 
quantity of good i demanded and hib  < 0 a quantity of good i supplied by the household 
(i = 1, 2). In this notation, the first period budget constraint of the generic household h 
reads as 
 
1p
hx1 + q 
hb  = 1p
h
1ω                                                                                              (2.4) 
 
and the household’s expected budget constraint for period 2 can be written as 
 
hp2
hx2  = 
hp2
h
2ω +  '2hp hb                                                                                         (2.5) 
 
where hp2  denotes the future prices in terms of good 1 as anticipated by the household 
and '2
hp  = (1, hp22 ) is the vector whose components coincide with the first two 
components of hp2 . 
 Once these adjustments have been introduced, the economy can be described 
along the same lines as in the introductory model. We accordingly assume that given 
the current and expected prices, the generic household h chooses its current 
consumption, current trading on forward markets and planned future consumption at 
the initial date so as to maximise the utility function hU ( hx1 , 
hx2 ) subject to budget 
constraints (2.4)-(2.5). Provided that it is well-defined, this choice in turn identifies the 
optimal action        *ha = ( *1
hx , *1
hb , *2
hb ) taken by the household on period 1 markets, 
where *ha ∈ 2+ℜN . Within this framework, a temporary equilibrium of the modified 
exchange economy is finally defined as a system of current prices and a corresponding 
set of optimal actions on the part of the H households such that the N+2 current 
markets are simultaneously cleared. 
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It should be noted, however, that temporary equilibrium of the modified exchange 
economy will generally not exist under assumptions 2.1-2.2. As we shall see presently, 
the reason for this negative result is the fact that the introduction of an additional 
forward market has a substantial impact on trading opportunities and creates a problem 
as regards the determination of the behaviour of households.  
 The following example will help to clarify the nature of the problem. Assume that 
the price system ruling on forward markets at the beginning of period 1 is q = ( 1q , 2q ) 
such that 2q / 1q  = 2. Assume further that at the initial date the generic household h 
believes that the future price of good 2 will be hp22  > 2. In these circumstances, 
household h has a strong incentive to trade on forward markets for speculative 
purposes. Consider, for example, how the household will evaluate an operation 
consisting of buying forward a unit of good 2 and simultaneously selling forward two 
units of good 1. On the one hand, the household will see that the total cost of the 
operation is zero under the assumed price conditions. On the other, household h will 
calculate that in period 2 it will be able to exchange the unit of good 2 delivered to it 
for a quantity of good 1 that exceeds the two units that the household has undertaken to 
deliver. In particular, the household will calculate that the operation in question ensures 
a future profit equal to ( hp22 –2) units of numéraire. Household h will therefore conclude 
that by trading appropriately on forward markets it can increase its wealth at no cost 
or, to use a technical expression, that forward markets provide an opportunity for 
profitable arbitrage operations. It should now be recalled that the household is non-
satiated in both present and future consumption (Ass. 2.1.(a)) and accordingly feels that 
any increase in its future wealth will make it better off. It is then clear that in these 
circumstances, household h will tend to increase with no limit the quantity of good 2 for 
future delivery demanded in the present and financed by selling forward good 1. This 
means that household’s optimal action is not determined, however, and the possibility 
of the economy being in temporary equilibrium at the assumed price conditions must 
therefore be ruled out. 
 It is easy to show that the above argument can be repeated for all the states of the 
economy in which the prices quoted on current markets and those expected by the 
household h are such that ( 2q / 1q ) < 
hp22 . Moreover, a symmetrical argument shows 
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that in the event of current and expected prices being such that ( 2q / 1q ) > 
hp22 , 
household h would increase with no limit the quantity of good 1 for future delivery 
demanded in the present and financed by selling forward good 2. As a result, the 
household’s optimal action would again not be determined and the possibility of the 
economy being in temporary equilibrium would again therefore be ruled out. 
 It thus emerges from the above considerations that the modified exchange 
economy can be in temporary equilibrium only if profitable arbitrage operations appear 
impossible to all households, i.e. only if the equality ( 2q / 1q ) = 
hp22  holds for all h (the 
no-arbitrage condition). It should be noted, however, that this necessary condition 
requires households to share the same expectation as regards the future price of good 2. 
In the presence of subjective expectations, the possibility therefore exists that the no-
arbitrage condition may not be fulfilled at any admissible system of current prices. This 
is quite obvious in the case of fixed expectations, i.e. expectations that are independent 
of current prices as stated by Assumption 2.2(a). In this case, it is sufficient to imagine 
that just two households in the economy disagree over the future price of good 2 in 
order to be certain that the no-arbitrage condition will be violated at every system of 
current prices and that temporary equilibrium does not exist. The same problem also 
arises, however, under the assumption that expected prices are continuous functions of 
current prices, as individual expectation functions may well be such that two or more 
households disagree over the future price of good 2 at any system of current prices. For 
example, let us assume that three of the N households operating in the economy 
estimate the future price of good 2 as a weighted average of the price observed for that 
good in both the current period and the two previous periods. Let us further assume that 
the weights used to calculate the average differ among the three households. Under 
these assumptions, it will normally be found that at any given  p ≥ 0, at least two of the 
three households assign different values to the future price of good 2.   
 The problem that (perceived) arbitrage opportunities create for the existence of 
temporary equilibrium was pointed out by Green (1973) within the context of a pure-
exchange economy similar to the one examined here. Green showed that the problem is 
reduced when the expectation functions attributed to households associate to each 
admissible system of current prices a probability distribution of future prices. At the 
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same time, Green made it clear that this formulation of agents’ predictions does not 
entirely eliminate the difficulty, as there must still be a substantial ‘overlapping’ of 
individual expectations in order to prevent unlimited arbitrage operations on forward 
markets. 
 
3.  Extension to the case of economies with production 
We shall now see how the introductory model with a single forward market can be 
modified so as to transform it into a model of exchange and production. This extension 
of the model will provide an opportunity to point out the issues that arise in attempts to 
introduce production into the framework of temporary equilibrium analysis. 
 The first step towards the proposed extension consists of introducing the 
following basic changes in the model. To begin with, we assume that the N 
commodities traded in the economy include not only consumption goods but also goods 
and services susceptible of being used as production inputs. Second, we assume that a 
given number F of firms (indexed by f = 1, … , F) are active in the economy. Third, as 
in the Arrow-Debreu model, we assume that the ownership of each firm is divided 
among households at the initial date in accordance with a given allocation of 
‘ownership shares’. The last basic change to be made is closely related to the third. It 
will be shown below that households are generally willing to trade their shares of 
ownership in firms within a temporary equilibrium framework. We therefore assume 
that F distinct markets for the shares in the different firms are active in period 1 in 
addition to the N spot markets for commodities and the market for bonds specified in 
terms of good 1. Having thus altered the structure of the economy, we shall now go on 
to analyse the behaviour of agents in period 1. As in the previous section, it will be 
assumed for simplicity that the consumption good listed as ‘good 1’ is the numéraire 
and that agents have fixed price expectations.  
 Let us begin with the productive sector of the economy. We assume that the 
production processes available to firms develop in cycles, i.e. that inputs are employed 
at the beginning of period 1 and the corresponding outputs emerge at the beginning of 
period 2. A two-period production plan of the generic firm f will accordingly be 
denoted by the vector fy12  = (
fy1 , 
fy2 ), where the sub-vector 
fy1 ∈ N−ℜ  denotes first 
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period inputs and sub-vector fy2 ∈ N+ℜ  the associated future outputs. (Note that inputs 
are denoted by negative numbers.) The set of production plans that are technically 
feasible for firm f (the production set of the firm for short) will be denoted in turn by 
fY12 . 
 Due to the cyclical nature of production, the economy is endowed at the 
beginning of period 1 with given stocks of commodities derived from the activity of 
firms in the previous period. We assume that these stocks are entirely included in the 
initial endowments of households and that, for this reason, firms must finance their 
current input expenditure entirely by issuing bonds. We finally assume that each firm is 
run by a manager who is responsible for selecting the two-period production plan. 
Under these assumptions, the formation of production decisions can be described as 
follows. 
 At the beginning of period 1, the manager of the generic firm f is certain that the 
price system fp2 = (
fp12 , …, 
f
Np 2 ) such that 
fp2  ≥ 0, fp12  = 1 will obtain on future spot 
markets. Given the expected prices, the manager observes the prices p = ( 1p , 1q ) 
quoted on current markets and assesses the profitability of the alternative plans in fY12 . 
In evaluating a hypothetical plan fy12  = (
fy1 ,
fy2 ), the manager realises that the firm 
would have to issue a quantity of bonds fb such that 1q
fb  = –( 1p
fy1 ) in order to 
finance its current input expenditure and would accordingly have to repay fb  = –
(1/ 1q )( 1p
fy1 ) units of numéraire at the beginning of period 2. At the same time, the 
manager anticipates that the plan would yield future receipts equal to ( fp2
fy2 ) units of 
numéraire. According to the manager’s subjective expectations, the hypothetical plan 
under consideration would therefore yield profits equal to f2π  = [ fp2 fy2  + 
(1/ 1q )( 1p
fy1 )] in period 2. In order to simplify the treatment of production decisions, 
however, it is convenient to introduce an alterative formulation of these expected 
profits. Given that a quantity f2π  of the numéraire good for future delivery can be 
traded in the present on the bond market at the total price f1π  = ( 1q f2π ), we can say 
that the present value of the profits expected by the manager is f1π  = 1q [ fp2 fy2  + 
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(1/ 1q )( 1p
fy1 )]. By adopting the convention         
fq = 1q
fp2 , the present value of 
expected profits can then be expressed in the equivalent form f1π  = ( fq fy2 + 1p fy1 ), 
where, it should be noted, the components of vector fq  are precisely the ‘present 
prices’ of commodities for future delivery as calculated by the manager of firm f. 
Adopting this alternative formulation, we shall assume that the manager of the generic 
firm chooses the production plan so as to maximise the present value of expected 
profits.  
 
Assumption 3.1.  Given the expected prices fp2  and the current prices p, the manager 
of the generic firm f chooses a production plan that maximises the ‘profit function’ 
f
1π ( fy12 ) = ( fq fy2 + 1p fy1 ), where fq = 1q fp2 , subject to fy12∈ fY12 . 
 
 Under Ass. 3.1, the choice of the production plan at current prices p = ( 1p , 1q ) 
and fixed expected prices fp2  is formally equivalent to standard producer choice under 
complete forward markets at prices p” = ( 1p , 
fq ) and could be analysed in the same 
way. If we now use *12
fy  = ( *1
fy , *2
fy ) to denote the plan chosen by the manager of the 
firm f in accordance with Ass. 3.1, it is clear the manager’s choice identifies both the 
firm’s current demand for inputs and the current supply of bonds, where the latter is 
given by *fb = –(1/ 1q )( 1p
*
1
fy ), and therefore determines the optimal action *fa = 
( *1
fy , *fb ) taken by the firm on period 1 markets. 
 Now let us go on to examine the household sector. As previously assumed, 
households are endowed at the initial date with given ‘shares of ownership’ in the 
different firms. We shall denote the share endowment of the generic household h by the 
vector hθ  = ( h1θ , …, hFθ ) and assume that hθ  ≥ 0 for all h, ∑h hfθ  = 1 for all f. It 
should be clear from the description of firms’ behaviour that the possession of an 
ownership share in a firm throughout period 1 entitles the holder to the same proportion 
of the profits accruing to the firm at the beginning of period 2. It should be noted, 
however, that when the firms’ plans are announced at the initial date, households will 
estimate the associated receipts according to their individual expectations and will thus 
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typically form different opinions concerning the amount of profit to be earned by 
holding shares in any given firm. In the presence of those different opinions, it is 
natural to assume that households will find it advantageous to trade shares on the 
corresponding F markets in existence. Taking this aspect of the economy into account, 
we shall now examine the behaviour of households on period 1 markets after the 
announcement of the production plans selected by managers. 
 As regards trading on share markets, we shall drastically simplify our analysis by 
assuming that the shares of each firm are automatically transferred to the household (or 
group of households) expecting the highest amount of profit from the firm’s plan, at a 
price exactly equal to the present value of those expected profits.2  This assumption can 
be formally stated as follows. Define the present value of the profits that household h 
expects from the plan *12
fy  announced by firm f as hf1π  = 1q [ hp2 *2fy + (1/ 1q )( 1p *1fy )] 
and consider the equivalent formulation hf1π = ( hq *2fy + 1p *1fy ), where vector            
                                                 
2 It should be noted that this assumption is not totally ad hoc, as it can be justified for particular 
constellations of individual expectations. To clarify this point, let us examine the demand for the shares 
of the generic firm f on the part of the generic household h at different prices. To begin with, let us 
assume that the price for the whole of firm f’s shares coincides with ( 1q
hf
2π ), i.e. with the present value 
of the amount of future profits hf2π  that h expects from the plan announced by the firm. It is readily 
ascertained that in these circumstances, the question of whether to purchase the whole of firm f’s shares 
or invest ( 1q
hf
2π ) units of numéraire on the bond market will be a matter of indifference to h. It follows 
that in the event of the price for 100% of the firm’s shares being higher than ( 1q
hf
2π ), the household’s 
demand for shares in firm f would be zero, as it would prefer to invest its savings in bonds. Finally it 
should be noted that in the event of the price for the whole of the firm’s shares being lower than 
( 1q
hf
2π ), household h would have an incentive to buy the firm outright and finance the purchase by 
borrowing on the bond market, because in the household’s opinion the operation would ensure a positive 
profit in period 2 at no cost. Having established these preliminary results, let us assume for simplicity 
that there are only three households in the economy (h = 1, 2, 3) and that individual price expectations 
are such that f12π ≥ f22π ≥ f32π . In those circumstances, it can be argued (a) that the equilibrium price for 
the whole of firm f’s shares cannot be higher than ( 1q
f1
2π ) and (b) that the equilibrium price cannot be 
lower than ( 1q
f2
2π ), since at a price lower than ( 1q f12π ) at least two households would be interested in 
purchasing the whole of firm f’s shares and an aggregate excess demand would accordingly appear on 
the market for those shares. It can thus be concluded that the equilibrium price for 100% of the firm’s 
shares must lie in the interval  [( 1q
f1
2π ), ( 1q f22π )]. This in turn means that the assumption introduced 
in the text concerning the price for the shares of the generic firm can be justified in practice when the 
difference between f12π  and f22π  is negligible, and can be fully justified when two or more households 
have the most optimistic expectation as regards the firm’s profits (i.e. in the particular case in which 
f1
2π = f22π ≥ f32π ). 
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hq = 1q
hp2  denotes the ‘present prices’ of commodities for future delivery as 
calculated by household h. Then denote by fv  the current price for the whole of firm 
f’s shares, or market value of the firm for short. Finally, denote by hfθ  the share in firm 
f transferred to household h after the announcement of production plans. The following 
assumption then holds: 
 
Assumption 3.2. (a) The market value of the generic firm f in period 1 is 
 fv  =  
h
Max  hf1π  = hMax  ( hq *2fy + 1p *1fy ); 
(b)  for all h and all f, hfθ  ≥ 0 ; 
(c)  for all h and all  f, hfθ  > 0  if  and only if  hf1π  = fv ;  
(d)  for all  f,  ∑h hfθ  = ∑h hfθ  = 1. 
 
 As regards the market for bonds, we assume that each household issues bonds so 
as to capitalise its expected future wealth, which is given in the present context by the 
expected value of future endowments plus the household’s share of expected profits 
from firms. 
 
Assumption 3.3. At the beginning of period 1 the generic household h issues a quantity 
of bonds hb1  such that 1q
hb1  = 
hhq 2ω + ∑ f hfθ ( hq *2fy + 1p *1fy ).  
 
Under Ass. 3.3 the current wealth of the generic household is                             
hW1  = 1p
h
1ω  + ff hf v∑ θ + 1q hb1 . Part of this wealth is used to pay for the share 
transfers carried out in accordance with Ass. 3.2 and the remainder is spent on 
commodities for current consumption and bonds. The first period budget constraint of 
household h is therefore given by the equation 
 
 1p
hx1  + ∑ f hfθ fv  + hbq 11  = 1p h1ω  + ∑ f hfθ fv  + 1q hb1                               (3.1) 
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which, by substituting for 1q
hb1  according to Ass. 3.3 and taking Ass. 3.2 into account, 
can be written3  
 
 1p
hx1 + 
hbq 11   = 1p
h
1ω  +  hhq 2ω  +  ∑ f hfθ fv                                                (3.1’) 
 
On the other hand, the household anticipates that in period 2 it will have to surrender 
both its commodity endowments and its share of firms’ profits in order to repay the 
bonds issued in accordance with Ass. 3.3. The household’s (expected) budget 
constraint for period 2 is therefore  
 
 hp2
hx2  = 
hb1                                                                                                        (3.2) 
 
 Comparison of budget constraints (3.1’)–(3.2) and budget constraints (2.1)–(2.2) 
of section 2 shows that once the firms’ plans have been announced and share transfers 
have taken place, households are fundamentally in the same position as in the 
introductory pure-exchange economy. We therefore assume that in these circumstances, 
the generic household h will choose its current consumption, current demand for bonds 
and planned future consumption so as to maximise the utility function hU ( hx1 , 
hx2 ) 
subject to constraints (3.1’)–(3.2). As in the introductory model, this choice will in turn 
determine the optimal action *ha = ( *1
hx , *1
hb ) taken by the household on period 1 
markets. 
 The description of agents’ behaviour at given current prices and fixed price 
expectations is now complete. Given that share markets are ‘automatically cleared’ in 
view of Ass. 3.2, a temporary equilibrium of exchange and production can be 
accordingly defined as a system of current prices, a corresponding set of F optimal 
                                                 
3 By substituting for 1q
hb1 as indicated in the text, the right-hand side of equation (3.1) becomes 
1p
h
1ω  + ∑ f hfθ fv + hhq 2ω + ∑ f hfθ ( hq *2fy + 1p *1fy ). 
As hfθ  is strictly positive if hf1π = ( hq *2fy + 1p *1fy ) = fv  and must otherwise be zero (Ass. 3.2 (b)-
(c)), the right-hand side can be rewritten in the equivalent form  
 1p
h
1ω  + ∑ f hfθ fv  + hhq 2ω + ∑ f hfθ fv . 
Once the right-hand side of equation (3.1) has been reformulated in this way, elimination of the total 
expenditure for shares ∑ f hfθ fv from both sides yields equation (3.1’). 
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actions on the part of firms, and a corresponding set of H optimal actions on the part of 
households such that the N spot markets and the market for bonds are simultaneously 
cleared in period 1. 
 It must be stated at this point that the model outlined in this section is not new but 
corresponds essentially to the temporary equilibrium model with production put 
forward by Arrow and Hahn (1971: Ch. 6).4 As regards the existence of temporary 
equilibrium we can therefore take advantage of the results obtained by those authors, 
who prove in this connection that temporary equilibrium of exchange and production 
exists under standard assumptions on preferences and productions sets. They also show 
that this result holds not only in the case of fixed expectations but also under the 
assumption that individual price expectations are continuous functions of current 
prices. Having thus briefly dealt with the question of existence, we shall now go on to 
closer examination of the assumptions concerning production decisions made in the 
extended model. It will be argued that they are more problematic than they may appear. 
 
                                                 
4 Our repeated reference to the contribution of these authors calls for some clarification as regards the 
link that can be established between the temporary equilibrium model with production of Arrow and 
Hahn (1971) and the models presented in this section and section 2.1 respectively. To start with the 
model outlined in this section, even though all the assumptions concerning the behaviour of agents are 
either borrowed from the Arrow-Hahn model or compatible with it, there are two differences in the 
formulation adopted. As readers can check, in the model of Arrow and Hahn prices are expressed in 
terms of a fictitious currency of account (‘bancors’) and the unit bond is defined as a promise to pay a 
unit of that currency in period 2. These differences are, however, immaterial. To substantiate this 
assertion, consider a version of the Arrow-Hahn model in which all agents expect that the future price of 
good 1 in terms of ‘bancors’ will be equal to 1. In these circumstances, which are fully compatible with 
Arrow and Hahn’s formal treatment of expectations, the market for bonds specified in ‘bancors’ 
becomes the same thing as a market for bonds specified in terms of good 1. As a result, the version of the 
Arrow-Hahn model under consideration coincides with the extended model outlined in this section 
except for the numéraire adopted. Given that the behaviour of agents in Arrow and Hahn’s contribution 
is independent of the numéraire measuring current prices, however, we can safely modify that version by 
taking good 1 as numéraire. Having thus established that the model with production presented in this 
section is simply a version of the Arrow-Hahn model, we shall now show that further specification of 
that version makes it possible to obtain precisely the pure-exchange model of section 2. Assume that 
there is only one firm in the economy (F=1) and that its production set is 112Y = 
N2+ℜ− . The last part of 
the assumption states that the only processes the firm can operate are free disposal processes, through 
which any good available in any of the two periods is instantaneously destroyed by using no other input 
than the good itself. Under this particular specification of the productive sector, which is compatible with 
Arrow and Hahn’s formal model despite its ad hoc nature, the single firm in existence will remain totally 
inactive in period 1 at every non-negative vector of current prices. As a result, the particular ‘production 
economy’ under consideration coincides in fact with the pure-exchange economy of section 2.1.  
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3.2. Discussion of the extended model 5 
In the intertemporal model of Arrow and Debreu, the existence of complete forward 
markets for commodities allows simple treatment of production decisions within firms. 
Let us consider, within that model, the position of the households holding ownership 
shares in a generic firm at the initial date. On the one hand, each household is interested 
in receiving the highest amount of profit from the firm, as any increase in profit would 
correspondingly increase the household’s initial wealth and therefore improve the 
household’s consumption opportunities. On the other, the profitability of the alternative 
production plans that are feasible for the firm can be assessed objectively on the basis 
of the prices observable on the current system of spot and forward markets. It follows 
from these considerations that the households sharing the ownership of a generic firm 
at the initial date will unanimously approve the choice of a production plan that 
maximises profits calculated at the currently observed prices.6  
 By contrast, the treatment of production decisions encounters considerable 
complications in a temporary equilibrium framework. In order to discuss the main 
issues that arise, let us return to the Arrow-Hahn model as presented in the first part of 
this section and focus on the position of households at the initial date. Jointly 
considered, budget constraints (3.1’)-(3.2) show that the utility a household can plan to 
obtain by trading on current markets increases with the value of its period 1 wealth, 
which in turn depends partly on the value of the household’s initial endowment of 
shares. This means that any household holding an initial share in the generic firm f will 
favour the choice of the production plan that receives the highest evaluation on the 
market for the firm’s shares, i.e. the choice of the plan that maximises the market value 
of the firm fv . According to Ass. 3.1, however, the manager of the generic firm will 
select the plan to which he individually attaches the greatest present value, so that he 
does not even try in general to act in the interest of the firm’s initial owners. An 
unsatisfactory feature of the model is therefore that the criterion of choice attributed to 
managers has no clear rationale. We shall now show that this shortcoming is not easily 
remedied, as it is a symptom of an authentic analytical problem. 
                                                 
5 This part is based on Ravagnani (1989, 2000). 
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 Suppose for the sake of argument that the manager of the generic firm, in an 
effort to serve the interests of the initial owners, forms a definite opinion as regards the 
production plan that will generate the highest market value of the firm and then 
announces that he intends to implement precisely this project. Since the manager’s 
opinion is necessarily subjective, the firm’s initial owners may happen to have a 
different opinion and wish to alter the manager’s decision. Moreover, the initial owners 
may well have conflicting opinions as regards which plan will ensure maximisation of 
the firm’s market value. In these circumstances, no production plan could be 
unanimously approved by the initial owners and a sort of social choice problem would 
therefore arise within the constituency of the firm’s owners. While this problem could 
be tackled in principle by assuming that some institutional rule leading to a definite 
production decision is at work within the firm, the fact that a variety of such rules can 
be conceived (e.g. different voting schemes) makes it hard to see how that assumption 
should be precisely specified. 
 On the other hand, it is possible to adopt a pragmatic attitude and argue that the 
assumption that managers choose production plans according to their own evaluation of 
future receipts provides a realistic representation of where control over firms actually 
resides (see, for example, Bliss, 1976: 194–195). This attitude may explain why that 
assumption has been commonly adopted in temporary equilibrium models with 
production. As discussion of a further shortcoming of the Arrow-Hahn model will 
presently show, however, the assumption of production plans autonomously chosen by 
managers is hardly tenable in a temporary equilibrium framework. 
 The aspect we shall now discuss concerns the financing of the production plans 
selected by managers in accordance with their personal expectations of future receipts. 
As shown above, Arrow and Hahn assume that firms finance those plans by selling 
bonds on a single market where the securities issued by different agents are traded at 
the same price and therefore treated as perfect substitutes. It is highly doubtful, 
however, that rational households would be generally willing to trade on that single 
bond market. A simple example will clarify this point.  
   
6 This argument presupposes that the owners of the generic firm are ‘price takers’, i.e. they believe that 
current  prices are not appreciably altered by changes in the firm’s production plan. 
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 Consider an economy with only two firms and assume that the manager of each 
firm selects a plan that maximises the present value of profits calculated on the basis of 
his individual price expectations. Then assume that when the manager of firm 1 
announces the chosen plan, all the other agents in the economy expect that the future 
price of planned output will be so low as to generate negative profits for the firm in 
period 2. Finally, assume that all households expect positive profits from the plan 
announced by firm 2. In such circumstances, the entire ownership of firm 1 would be 
transferred to the firm’s manager when the markets open at the initial date. Moreover, 
the following situation would occur on the bond market. Except for the optimistic 
manager of firm 1, all households in the economy would calculate that firm 1 is going 
to issue bonds that cannot be repaid out of the firm’s future receipts – and since they do 
not know whether the future wealth of the firm’s new owner will be sufficient to 
guarantee repayment, those households would have to regard the bonds floated by firm 
1 as risky assets. At the same time, they would regard the bonds issued by firm 2 as 
perfectly safe. The announcement of the production plans independently chosen by 
managers would thus signal to households that in the overall supply of bonds risky 
assets may coexist with others whose repayment is beyond doubt. In this situation it is 
unreasonable to suppose, as the Arrow-Hahn model implicitly does, that households 
may be disposed to purchase bonds on a single, ‘anonymous’ market where risky 
securities cannot be distinguished from safe ones.7 
                                                 
7 Problematic situations such as the one described in the text may also arise if the Arrow-Hahn model is 
modified by assuming that managers endeavour to select production plans that maximise the market 
value of their respective firms. For example, consider an economy with two firms, A and B, that can 
produce two different qualities of wine by employing grape must as the only input. Assume that each 
firm can produce any combination of wines by operating two independent processes defined by the 
production functions 12y  = 
2/1
1)( y−  for wine of type 1 and 22y  = 2 2/11)( y−  for wine of type 2, where 
1y  (a negative number) denotes the quantity of must employed and 2iy  the output of wine of type i      
(i = 1, 2). Assume further that there are four households in the economy characterised by the following 
fixed expectations. Household 1, which includes only the manager of firm A, expects that the price for 
wine of type 1 will be 12pˆ  > 0 and that the price for wine of type 2 will be zero. Household 2 has the 
same expectations as household 1. Household 3, which includes only the manager of firm B, expects that 
the price for wine of type 1 will be zero and that the price for wine of type 2 will be                     22p  = 
1/2 12pˆ . Finally, household 4 has the same expectations of household 3. Now recall that in the Arrow-
Hahn model, the market value of each firm coincides with the present value of the profits that the most 
optimistic household (or group of households) expects from the firm’s plan (Ass. 3.2). Taking this 
assumption into account, we can readily see that at any given positive price for grape must, there are 
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 In order to avoid the abovementioned shortcoming, the model would have to be 
reformulated so as to enable potential lenders to identify the agents issuing bonds and 
learn how they plan to repay their debts. This could be done by introducing a separate 
market for the bonds issued by any individual agent, but then the hypothesis that 
managers autonomously select production plans could hardly be retained. For example, 
suppose that the manager of the generic firm f selected a definite plan fy12  with the 
intention of covering the input cost through the sale of a sufficient quantity of bonds at 
price fbp . When the plan is announced, households would evaluate future output 
according to their own price expectations (as well as the future wealth of the firm’s 
owners, if the latter are legally responsible for the firm’s debt) in order to assess the 
amount that could be paid back to lenders, and would thus form an opinion about the 
rate of return that could actually be obtained on the bonds supplied by firm f. If this 
largely subjective rate of return proved to be lower than that expected on the bonds of 
some other firm, however, households would not buy firm f’s securities. It would then 
be impossible to implement the plan chosen by the manager, and the theory would have 
to explain how the original project is to be revised. 
 Discussion of the Arrow-Hahn model thus shows that in the presence of 
subjective price expectations, it is not reasonable to assume that managers can raise 
funds freely on capital markets. If the hypothesis that managers determine production 
choices independently is to be maintained, temporary equilibrium theory would 
therefore have to introduce financing processes that do not depend on borrowing. It 
   
always two distinct production plans that ensure maximisation of the market value of the generic firm in 
the economy under consideration. The first involves producing only wine of type 1 in the quantity that 
maximises the present value of profits calculated at the positive price expected for that wine by 
households 1 and 2. The second involves producing only wine of type 2 in the quantity that maximises 
the present value of profits calculated at the positive price expected for that wine by households 3 and 4. 
Having established this point, assume that managers seek to maximise the market value of their 
respective firms and that if two or more plans ensuring this result are identified, each manager will 
choose the one that he thinks will yield the highest amount of profits (reasonable behaviour). Finally, 
assume for the sake of argument that both managers can correctly predict how individual households will 
evaluate any feasible production plan. Under these assumptions, each manager will be able to identify 
the pair of plans that ensure maximisation of the market value of his firm when markets open in period 1. 
Moreover, the manager of firm A will choose and announce the plan that involves producing only wine 
of type 1, while the manager of firm B will opt for and announce the plan that involves producing only 
wine of type 2. On the other hand, every household will calculate that one of the announced plans will 
yield positive profits while the other is bound to bring about losses. The announcement of production 
plans will thus signal to households that risky bonds may coexist with safe ones in the overall supply. 
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should be noted in this connection that an alternative has been suggested in temporary 
equilibrium literature, notably by Grandmont and Laroque (1976). This rests essentially 
on two assumptions. The first is that the stocks of produced commodities available in 
the economy at the initial date are not in the hands of households, as postulated by 
Arrow and Hahn, but constitute the initial endowments of firms. This means that at the 
current prices each firm is endowed with well-defined initial wealth. The second 
assumption is that each firm must finance its current input expenditure entirely out of 
its wealth. Let us now consider whether the hypothesis that managers choose 
production plans independently is immune to problems under these alternative 
assumptions. The following example prompts a negative answer. 
 Assume that the manager of the generic firm f, guided by his personal evaluation 
of future receipts, chooses a production plan that involves using the whole of the firm’s 
initial wealth to finance input expenditure. Assume further that when the manager’s 
decision is announced, all the households in the economy (except for the manager’s) 
anticipate that the firm’s planned output will have negligible value in the future. In 
these circumstances, it is reasonable to imagine that the current price for the whole of 
the firm’s ownership shares would be very close to zero. Assume that this is indeed the 
case and consider the position of the initial owners of firm f. Apart from the negligible 
price they could receive from the sale of their shares in the firm, these owners would 
calculate that the manager’s decision requires them to give up some of their potential 
period 1 wealth (corresponding to the value of the firm’s commodity endowment) in 
order to finance a project that they regard as a sheer waste of resources. At the same 
time, each owner would calculate that he would be better off if the firm were instructed 
to close down, as then he could regain his share of the firm’s initial wealth and improve 
his consumption opportunities. Even though there may be disagreements concerning 
the ‘optimal’ plan to put into operation, all the initial owners would thus prefer the firm 
not to engage in production, and in the presence of this unanimously preferred option it 
is paradoxical to suppose that they would passively agree to finance the manager’s 
project. 
 The considerations put forward thus far indicate that the assumption that 
managers select production plans according to their personal anticipations of future 
revenues should be avoided in a temporary equilibrium framework, as the divergence of 
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individual expectations makes it difficult to assume that managers would then be free to 
finance the chosen plans either by borrowing on capital markets or by using the wealth 
of their respective firms. On the contrary, temporary equilibrium theory should admit 
that managers’ decisions are subject to the ultimate judgement of savers, who may 
refuse to supply the required funds and thus force revision of the original projects. In 
this situation it would appear more appropriate to assume that managers, when 
selecting production plans, take into account the opinion of the agents who provide 
funds to the productive sector. This assumption gives rise to a new problem, however, 
because in order to develop a plausible notion of temporary equilibrium, the theory 
would have to explain how managers can succeed in correctly interpreting the private 
opinions of the potential financiers of firms.  
 
4. Temporary equilibrium in economies with ‘money’ 
The models discussed in the previous sections fail to capture one aspect of real-world 
trading processes, namely the fact that economic agents wish to keep stocks of a special 
good – money – that has no intrinsic value and is used essentially in exchange against 
physical goods. It should be noted, however, that much of the research carried out by 
temporary equilibrium theorists had the precise aim of incorporating money into 
modern general equilibrium analysis. In this section we shall therefore illustrate some 
basic results emerging from that specific application of temporary equilibrium theory.8 
This will be done through reference to a simple model drawn from Grandmont (1983), 
whose basic features are summarised below. 
 The model regards an exchange economy in which spot markets are active in 
each period, no forward market exists, and agents can transfer wealth from one period 
to the next only by holding a particular asset, ‘money’, which is available in the system 
in a constant amount. By assumption, the existing stock of this asset is made up entirely 
of outside (i.e. paper) money and can therefore be seen as part of the households’ net 
wealth. The model is exclusively concerned with the store-of-value function of the 
asset and does not consider the other services performed by money in real-world 
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economies (e.g. as a medium of exchange). Moreover, money is taken as numéraire and 
the behaviour of agents is analysed under the condition of strictly positive monetary 
prices. It should be noted that this choice of numéraire is incompatible with states of 
the economy characterised by aggregate excess supply of money, as the exchange value 
of money in terms of any commodity would clearly be zero in such circumstances. The 
main issue addressed by the model is therefore whether a temporary equilibrium for 
period 1 exists in which households are willing to hold the whole stock of money in 
circulation. Let us now go on to develop a detailed formal exposition. 
 As in Section 2, we shall refer to an economy with H households and N non-
storable consumption goods that is active for two periods of time.9 At the beginning of 
period 1, the generic household h has both a commodity endowment h1ω  and an 
endowment of money hm  stemming from its past saving decisions. It is also certain 
that its future commodity endowment will be h2ω . The household observes the 
monetary prices 1p ∈ N++ℜ  quoted on current spot markets and expects the system of 
monetary prices hp2  to obtain in period 2. (We shall continue to denote prices as in the 
previous sections even though they are now expressed in money for the sake of 
economy of notation.) Unlike the arguments developed in sections 2 and 3, we do not 
regard the vector hp2  as fixed but assume that expected prices depend on current prices. 
To be more precise, we assume that hp2  =
hΨ ( 1p ), where the expectation function hΨ  
can include past prices among its parameters. Finally we introduce the following 
assumption concerning the characteristics and expectations of households: 
 
Assumption 4.1. (a) The generic household h has a preference ordering over two-
period consumption streams in the set X h12  = 
N2
+ℜ  that can be represented by the 
continuous, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave utility function        
hU ( hx1 , 
hx2 ); 
   
8 For an extensive treatment of the monetary issues addressed by temporary equilibrium theorists –  
which include the validity of the quantitative theory, the possibility of monetary authorities to manipulate 
the interest rate, and the existence of a ‘liquidity trap’ – the reader is referred to Grandmont (1983). 
9 The analysis that follows can, however, be readily extended to economies in which markets are active 
for more than two periods and households formulate their plans accordingly (cf. Grandmont, 1983, Ch. 
1). 
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(b) for all h, h1ω  >> 0,  h2ω >> 0; 
(c) hm  ≥ 0  for all  h,   Σ h hm  =  M > 0; 
(d) for all h, the expectation function hΨ  is continuous and such that  
hΨ ( 1p )∈ N++ℜ    for every 1p ∈ N++ℜ . 
. 
Note that by postulating that households expect strictly positive but finite monetary 
prices for period 2, part (d) rules out two circumstances under which there is no reason 
to transfer money to that period, namely the case in which households think that the 
future money prices of all commodities will be zero and the case in which they are 
certain that future commodity prices in terms of money will be infinite (i.e. that money 
will have no exchange value in period 2). 
 Let us now examine the behaviour of households at the beginning of period 1. 
Given the ruling prices and the associated expected prices, the generic household h 
must choose a most preferred two-period consumption stream out of those it believes it 
can attain in view both of the value of its commodity endowments and of the possibility 
of transferring money to period 2. It can be stated in formal terms that at any given 
price system 1p ∈ N++ℜ , the generic household h must solve the following problem: 
 
[4.I]  Maximise hU ( hx1 , hx2 ) with respect to hx1  ≥ 0, hm1  ≥ 0, hx2  ≥ 0, 
 subject to the current and expected budget constraints: 
1p
hx1 + 
hm1  = 1p
h
1ω  + hm                                                                                 (4.1) 
hΨ ( 1p ) hx2  = hΨ ( 1p ) h2ω  + hm1                                                                         (4.2) 
 
where the choice variable hm1  denotes the amount of money demanded in the present 
and carried over to period 2 in order to finance future consumption. Note that hm1  must 
be non-negative because, by assumption, the household cannot borrow money in period 
1. Note also that the household does not plan to demand money in period 2, as it is 
aware that economic activity is going to cease at the end of that period.10  
                                                 
10 It should be noted that the lack of incentives to demand money in period 2 creates a problem, because 
if the generic household thought that all the other agents would also abstain from demanding money in 
that period, it could not reasonably expect money to have a positive exchange value in the future as 
30 
 Discussion of the solution to problem [4.I] will be facilitated by focusing on 
budget constraints (4.1)–(4.2). To begin with, it should be noted that the outcome of the 
problem remains the same if those constraints are modified by replacing the equality 
signs with inequality signs, since hU  is strictly increasing. We can therefore consider 
the modified budget constraints 
 
1p
hx1 + 
hm1  ≤ 1p h1ω  + hm   
hΨ ( 1p ) hx2  ≤ hΨ ( 1p ) h2ω  + hm1  
 
On adding up the modified constraints and eliminating hm1 , it becomes clear that the 
consumption stream chosen by the household must fulfil the inequality 
 
 1p
hx1 + 
hΨ ( 1p ) hx2   ≤  1p h1ω  + hΨ ( 1p ) h2ω + hm                                          (4.1’) 
 
which we shall call the intertemporal budget constraint of household h. On the other 
hand, we know that hm1  must be non-negative, i.e. that the household cannot borrow 
money in period 1. This means that the consumption stream chosen by the household 
must also fulfil the inequality 
   
stated by Ass. 1(d). Moreover, it can be argued that the same problem arises when the two-period model 
put forward in the text is extended to economies that are active for a higher but finite number of periods. 
To clarify this point in intuitive terms, assume (a) that economic activity comes to an end in an arbitrarily 
given period T > 2 and (b) that all agents are aware of that future event. Then consider a generic 
household operating in the economy at the beginning of period 1. Under assumptions (a)-(b), the 
household would calculate that no agent will want to hold money balances in the terminal period T and 
that, for this reason, money will have no exchange value in that period. Moreover, the household would 
calculate that at the beginning of period T-1 all agents in the economy will similarly realise that money is 
going to be worthless in the terminal period. The household would accordingly conclude that no agent 
will want to hold money balances in period T-1 and that, as a result, money will be worthless in that 
period too. By further pursuing this line of reasoning, the generic household would eventually conclude 
that money will be worthless in every future period. In order to avoid the problem under discussion, the 
temporary equilibrium model with ‘money’ should therefore be modified by assuming that economic 
activity extends indefinitely over time. Within that context, the fact that human life has limited duration 
could be taken into account by assuming that two generations of households co-exist in the economy in 
every period of time, an ‘older’ generation initially endowed with the whole money stock and a 
‘younger’ generation demanding money in the belief that the new younger generation will do the same in 
the subsequent period (cf., for example, Grandmont and Laroque, 1973). The structure of the temporary 
equilibrium model with ‘money’ would thus become more complex, since the maximisation problem 
attributed to the younger generation should be neatly distinguished from that attributed to the older one. 
There is no need to introduce this complex construction for our purposes, however, as the conditions 
ensuring the existence of temporary monetary equilibrium would remain essentially the same as those 
emerging from the simple model examined in this section. 
31 
 
 1p
hx1  ≤ 1p h1ω  + hm                                                                                        (4.2’) 
 
which we shall call the liquidity constraint of household h.11 It can be stated in the light 
of these considerations that problem [4.I] can be solved in two steps. In the first, the 
generic household determines its optimal consumption stream *12
hx = ( *1
hx , *2
hx ) by 
solving the problem 
  
[4.II]  Maximise hU ( hx1 , hx2 ) with respect to hx1  ≥ 0, hx2  ≥ 0, 
  subject to constraints (4.1’)–(4.2’) 
 
In the second, it determines its optimal demand of money *1
hm  through the condition    
*
1
hm  = 1p
h
1ω + hm – 1p *1hx .   
 Let us focus on problem [4.II] and define the opportunity set of household h as 
the set of two-period consumption streams in X h12  = 
N2
+ℜ  that fulfil both the constraints 
(4.1’)-(4.2’). It is easily proved that this set is compact and convex under the 
assumption that both the current and the expected prices are strictly positive.12 Given 
that hU  is strictly quasi-concave, it follows from the properties of the opportunity set 
that problem [4.II] uniquely determines the consumption stream *12hx  = ( *1hx , *2hx ) 
chosen by household h at any given 1p ∈ N++ℜ . In these circumstances, the amount of 
money demanded by the household is itself uniquely determined in the second step of 
the procedure. We therefore conclude that both the household’s current consumption 
demand *1
hx  and its money demand *1
hm  can be represented as functions of (strictly 
positive) vectors of current prices, which we shall denote by hx1 (p1) and 
hm1 (p1) 
                                                 
11 Constraints (4.1’)-(4.2’) can be interpreted in economic terms as follows.  Assume for the moment 
that household h is not only able to transfer money balances to period 2 but also to borrow money at no 
interest in period 1 within the limit set by its expected future wealth. It is easy to ascertain that in these 
circumstances, the household will only be subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (4.1’). Since we 
are assuming that the amount of money the household can actually borrow is zero, however, the liquidity 
constraint (4.2’) on current consumption expenditure must also be introduced. 
12 Key: under the assumption mentioned in the text, the opportunity set is the intersection of two convex 
and compact sets. 
32 
respectively. In this notation, the optimal action *ha = ( *1
hx , *1
hm ) taken by household h 
at any given 1p ∈ N++ℜ  is univocally identified by the function ha (p1) = ( hx1 (p1), 
hm1 (p1)). 
 Let us now consider the first period excess demand function of the generic 
household h, defined as hz1 (p1) = 
hx1 (p1)–
h
1ω , and the household’s money demand 
function hm1 (p1). It can be proved that they are both continuous functions (Grandmont, 
1983: App. B, p. 165). It should also be noted that since the household’s optimal choice 
must fulfil budget constraint (4.1), the equality 1p
hz1 ( 1p ) + 
hm1 ( 1p ) = 
hm  necessarily 
holds at every strictly positive vector of current prices. It follows from this last 
consideration that first period aggregate excess demands satisfy Walras’s  Law: 
 
 1p Σh hz1 ( 1p ) + Σh hm1 ( 1p ) =  Σh hm  =  M       for every 1p ∈ N++ℜ                    (4.3) 
 
 Given the above formal description of the behaviour of households, a temporary 
monetary equilibrium of the exchange economy for period 1 can be finally defined as a 
system of monetary prices *1p ∈ N++ℜ , and a corresponding set of optimal actions on the 
part of households, such that the following market-clearing conditions are 
simultaneously satisfied: 
  
 Σh hz1 ( *1p ) = 0 ,   Σh hm1 ( *1p ) = Σh hm  = M                                                      (4.4) 
 
 Let us now address the question of the existence of temporary monetary 
equilibrium. It must be stated in this connection that existence is not guaranteed under 
Ass. 4.1. To clarify this point, we shall argue in steps by focusing on the simplified 
case of an exchange economy with a single consumption good (N = 1). In this case, the 
opportunity set of the generic household h at an arbitrary strictly positive price 1p  for 
the consumption good can be represented as in Figure 1. 
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By examining constraints (4.1’)-(4.2’) taken for N =1, it is easy to ascertain that the line 
going through points α and β, whose slope is 1p / hΨ ( 1p ), represents the intertemporal 
budget constraint, while the vertical half-line going through β represents the liquidity 
constraint. The optimal choice of household h therefore corresponds to point *12
hx , 
which in turn identifies both the household’s current excess demand for the 
consumption good and the household’s demand for money balances. We shall now use 
this graphic device to analyse how the optimal choice of the generic household changes 
as the current price for the consumption good changes from 1p . We shall only deal 
with a rise in the price, as the analysis that follows is easily adapted to the case of a fall. 
 Let us first assume that the household has unit elastic price expectations, i.e. that 
hΨ (λ 1p ) = λ hΨ ( 1p ) for every positive value of 1p  and every positive number λ. In 
this case, an increase in the current price of the consumption good from 1p  to λ 1p ,         
λ > 1, causes both the intertemporal budget line and the liquidity line to move to the 
left, without however altering the slope of the former. What basically happens is that 
*
12
hx
 
h
1ω  
hx1  
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the price rise proportionately reduces the purchasing power of the household’s money 
endowment while leaving the ‘relative price’ of present consumption in terms of future 
consumption unchanged at the initial level 1p /
hΨ ( 1p ). The rise in the current price 
thus generates a real balance effect that will in turn normally reduce the current 
demand for the consumption good (Figure 2). 
 
 Let us now assume instead that the household’s expectations are not unit elastic, 
i.e. that hΨ (λ 1p ) ≠ λ hΨ ( 1p ) for every 1p  > 0 and every λ > 0. In these 
circumstances, the change in the opportunity set generated by an increase in the current 
price from 1p  to λ 1p , λ > 1, can be broken down into two ‘successive’ changes. The 
first is the shift to the left of both the intertemporal budget line and the liquidity line 
that would take place if expectations were unit elastic. This is precisely the real balance 
effect mentioned above. The second is the rotation of the intertemporal budget line 
around the new point β’ due to the fact that the ‘relative price’ of present consumption 
in terms of future consumption must now change with respect to its initial level. This 
change in the relative price will further affect the household’s choice by giving rise to 
β
h
1ω  
hx1  
hx2  
Figure 2 
'β
h
2ω
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an intertemporal substitution effect. If the elasticity of expectations is lower than 1 
( hΨ (λ 1p ) < λ hΨ ( 1p )), the intertemporal budget line rotates upward and the 
intertemporal substitution effect is likely to reduce present consumption, thereby 
reinforcing the real balance effect (Figure 3). If elasticity is higher than 1, the 
intertemporal substitution effect is likely to act in the opposite direction and the overall 
effect of the price rise on the household’s choice cannot be assessed a priori.  
 
In the light of the above analysis, we can now discuss the existence of temporary 
monetary equilibrium for the one-commodity exchange economy. We shall show first 
of all that existence is not guaranteed when expectations ‘depend too much’ on the 
currently observed price. This will be done by means of two examples taken from 
Grandmont (1983: 22-24), in which it is implicitly assumed that hm  > 0 holds for all h. 
 
Example 1. A preliminary remark is called for in connection with the first example. 
Recall that the preferences of households can be represented by strictly increasing and 
strictly quasi-concave utility functions. It should thus be clear from Figure 4 that at any 
h
2ω ω β  
h
1ω  
hx1  
hx2
Figure 3
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given 1p  > 0, the current consumption demand of the generic household h will exceed 
the endowment h1ω  if and only if the ‘relative price’ 1p / hΨ ( 1p ) is lower than the 
household’s marginal rate of substitution evaluated at point                             
α = ( h1ω , h2ω + hm / hΨ ( 1p )).  
 
Having established this preliminary result, let us assume that the households’ utility 
functions can be written  w( hx1 ) + 
hδ w( hx2 ),  h = 1, …, H, where w( .) is strictly 
concave and differentiable and 0 < hδ < 1 for all h. Let us further assume that the 
expectation function of household h is such that the following condition holds: 
 
 
)( 1
1
p
p
hΨ  ≤  )(
)(
2
'
1
'
hh
h
w
w
ωδ
ω           for every 1p  > 0                                                  (4.5) 
 
where the term on the right-hand side of the inequality is the household’s marginal rate 
of substitution evaluated at the endowment point hω  = ( h1ω , h2ω ). Given that the 
marginal rate of substitution increases as we move upward along the vertical half-line 
α
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with origin ( h1ω , 0), since w( .) is strictly concave, it becomes clear that at any positive 
value of the current price, the household will be precisely in the position depicted in 
Figure 4, and will therefore manifest an excess demand for the consumption good in 
period 1. If we finally assume that expectation functions are such that condition (4.5) 
holds for all h, it is clear that at every 1p  > 0, there will be an aggregate excess demand 
on the current commodity market, which will be accompanied in accordance with 
Walras’s law by a corresponding aggregate excess supply of money. This means that no 
temporary equilibrium exists for period 1 in which households are willing to hold the 
whole stock of money in circulation. In particular, the phenomenon described will 
occur when expectation functions are unit elastic and such that, for all h, the (constant) 
‘relative price’ 1p /
hΨ ( 1p ) fulfils condition (4.5). 
 
Example 2. Let us assume that preferences are such that, for all h, the value of the 
marginal rate of substitution along the vertical half-line with origin ( h1ω , 0) is bounded 
above by a strictly positive number hv . Let us further assume that expectations are 
such that the following condition holds for all h: 
 
 
)( 1
1
p
p
hΨ  > 
hv       for every 1p  > 0                                                                    (4.6) 
 
Under these assumptions, each household will be in a situation opposite to the one 
shown in Figure 4 at any given 1p  > 0. As a result, 
hz1 ( 1p ) < 0, hm1 ( 1p ) > hm  will 
hold for all h at every 1p  > 0 and temporary monetary equilibrium will not exist. In 
particular, this phenomenon will occur when expectations are unit elastic and such that 
for all h, the (constant) ‘relative price’ 1p /
hΨ ( 1p )  fulfils condition (4.6). 
 
 Similar examples could be constructed for economies with a variety of 
consumption goods (cf. Grandmont, 1983: 25). The simple examples put forward are, 
however, sufficient to develop the relevant economic considerations. To begin with, let 
us consider Example 1 on the hypothesis of unit elastic expectations. As we have seen, 
at an arbitrarily chosen 1p  > 0 there is aggregate excess demand on the period 1 
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commodity market. We also know that an increase in the current price from 1p  would 
generate a real balance effect that is likely to reduce that excess but cannot eliminate it 
completely. Similarly, on the hypothesis of unit elastic expectations, Example 2 shows 
that the real balance effect resulting from a fall in the current price may be not strong 
enough to compensate fully for an initial excess supply on the current commodity 
market. A negative conclusion therefore emerges from the temporary equilibrium 
model with ‘money’ as regards the effectiveness of the real balance effect as a 
mechanism capable of regulating the market. This negative conclusion attracted a great 
deal of attention when the original version of the model was published (Grandmont, 
1974), as its was commonly held among neoclassical economists at the time that the 
real balance effect would normally ensure market clearing in economies endowed with 
outside money (cf., for example, Patinkin, 1965).  
 It should further be noted that conditions (4.5) and (4.6) in the examples 
presented are constraints on the variability of the ‘relative price’ 1p /
hΨ ( 1p ) and 
therefore impose limits on the strength of the intertemporal substitution effects that can 
be generated by changes in 1p . It may accordingly be conjectured that the introduction 
of restrictions on expectations capable of ensuring high variability of this ‘relative 
price’ could allow the intertemporal substitution effects engendered by changes in 1p  
to become strong enough to reinforce the real balance effect and eliminate 
disequilibrium on current markets. The following argument indicates that this is a 
reasonable conjecture. 
  Assume that in the single-commodity exchange economy with ‘money’ there is a 
household h  whose expectations are ‘insensitive’ to large changes in 1p , in the sense 
that two numbers ε > 0, η > 0 exist such that ε ≤ hΨ ( 1p ) ≤ η for every 1p  > 0 
(bounded expectations). Under this assumption, it can be stated (a) that for 1p  large 
enough an aggregate excess supply appears on the period 1 commodity market and (b) 
that for 1p  low enough an aggregate excess demand appears on that market. By 
continuity, a price *1p  > 0 should then exist that leads to equilibrium on the current 
commodity market and, in view of Walras’s Law, on the money market as well. 
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 In the above argument, statement (a) can be justified on the grounds that when 1p  
rises indefinitely, point β of the ‘insensitive’ household’s opportunity set tends to the 
endowment point hω  and the slope of the intertemporal budget line rises with no limit. 
As a result, the household’s planned demand for future consumption tends to infinity 
together with the household’s current demand for money. Since by assumption the 
money demand of every household is bounded below by zero, this means that as 1p  
progressively increases, an aggregate excess demand for money must eventually appear 
in period 1 with a corresponding aggregate excess supply on the current commodity 
market. As regards statement (b), note that when 1p  falls progressively towards zero, 
point β in the insensitive household’s opportunity set shifts indefinitely to the right, 
while the slope of the intertemporal budget line tends to zero, thus giving rise to a 
strong substitution effect in favour of current consumption. As a result, the insensitive 
household’s demand for present consumption tends to infinity. Since the current 
consumption demand of the generic household h is bounded below by – h1ω , this means 
that with the progressive fall in 1p , an aggregate excess demand must eventually 
appear on the current commodity market.  
 The above heuristic argument indicating that the assumption of bounded 
expectations ensures the existence of temporary monetary equilibrium can be 
rigorously formulated and generalised to exchange economies with any finite number 
of goods. The following theorem has indeed been proved for N ≥ 1: 
 
Theorem. Let Assumption 4.1 hold in the exchange economy with ‘money’. Assume 
further that there is at least one household h , with hm > 0, whose expectations are 
bounded in the sense that two vectors ε∈ N++ℜ , η∈ N++ℜ  exist such that                        
ε ≤ hΨ ( 1p ) ≤ η  for every 1p ∈ N++ℜ  . Then a temporary monetary equilibrium 
exists. 
 
Proof:  cf. Grandmont (1983: Appendix B). 
 
 The assumption of bounded expectations has been generalised to the case of 
monetary economies in which agents’ predictions take the form of probability 
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distributions over future prices (cf., for example, Grandmont, 1974). But is this really a 
plausible assumption? As noted, it postulates that price expectations are ‘rigid’ with 
respect to large variations in current prices and in particular that the price expected for 
any commodity remains practically unchanged when the current price keeps rising 
(falling) beyond a sufficiently high (low) level. It is quite doubtful, however, that 
expectations would normally display this property. As an expert in the field has pointed 
out, ‘[p]rice forecasts are indeed somewhat volatile, and are presumably quite sensitive 
to the level of current prices’ (Grandmont, 1983: 26). On the other hand, the examples 
presented in this section show that temporary monetary equilibrium may not exist 
under such circumstances. The conclusion to be drawn is therefore that ‘the existence 
of a [temporary] equilibrium in which money has positive value is somewhat 
problematic’ (Grandmont, 1983: 27). 
 
5. Conclusions 
The studies in the field of temporary equilibrium theory carried out in the 1970s and 
early 1980s endeavoured to overcome the limitations of the Arrow-Debreu model by 
focusing analysis on economies in which forward markets are limited in number or  
non-existent and trade takes place sequentially over time. As we have seen, the models 
put forward in that period examine the behaviour of economic agents in an arbitrarily 
chosen ‘initial period’, stress the dependence of agents’ decisions on their subjective 
price expectations, and analyse the conditions ensuring the existence of general 
equilibrium on current markets. According to the scholars active in the field, the 
analysis concerning this isolated period should be seen as the first step of a more 
extensive research programme, whose ultimate goal is to model the evolution of the 
economy as a sequence of temporary equilibria (Grandmont, 1977: 542–543; 1989: 
299).  
 The simplified exposition presented in this paper indicates, however, that the very 
first step of the programme pursued by temporary equilibrium theorists gives rise to 
serious problems. In particular, the discussion developed in the previous sections shows 
that a major source of difficulties for the treatment of temporary equilibrium in a single 
market period is precisely the central role attributed to the subjective price expectations 
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of economic agents. This point is first illustrated with reference to economies with a 
numéraire commodity. Section 2 focuses on the case of pure exchange economies and 
shows that substantial difficulties arise in the determination of households’ behaviour if 
individual expectations are not sufficiently uniform. Section 3 addresses the case of 
economies with production and argues that the divergence of individual expectations 
creates additional difficulties in the treatment both of the formation of production 
decisions within firms and of the financing of production plans. Finally, section 4 goes 
on to consider monetary economies and shows that temporary equilibrium may not 
exist in those economies if expectations are overly sensitive to the level of current 
prices. 
 The above analytical difficulties may help to explain why research in the field of 
temporary equilibrium theory was abandoned about twenty-five years ago. More 
importantly, they afford some insight into why general equilibrium theorists have since 
chosen to study economies with sequential trade under the assumption of correct (or 
self-fulfilling) price expectations, for example along the lines indicated by Radner 
(1972). This assumption is normally taken for granted in advanced textbooks nowadays 
(cf., for example, Mas-Colell et al., 1995: 696), even though it presupposes that 
economic agents have extraordinarily strong predictive capabilities. In this situation, 
basic knowledge of temporary equilibrium models makes us aware of the fact that 
modern general equilibrium theory can hardly dispense with that special assumption. 
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